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The European Patent System consists of national patent offices 
(NPOs) and the supranational European Patent Office (EPO).  
EPO and the NPOs have granted patents in Europe side-by-side 
since 1980. The resulting patent system is complicated and less 
coordinated than might be expected. Firms must consider a number 
of variables when selecting the route of patenting they take within 
this system: price, rigour of examination, duration of examination, 
quality of legal redress. To date there is little descriptive evidence 
on how firms choose between EPO and national offices. This paper 
provides a rich descriptive analysis of patenting in Europe. We 
analyze how origin, size and technological focus of companies 
affect how they choose among patent offices within the EPS and 
report differences in examination durations and grant rates across 
patent offices. 
 
The European Patent System (EPS) has consisted of National 
Offices (NPOs) and the European Patent Office (EPO) since 1978.1 
The administrative rules governing the EPS have changed numerous 
times, be it because of administrative changes (e.g. adjustments to 
fee schedules and patent office rules), legal changes (e.g. 
patentability of genes) or due to judicial decisions (e.g. on parallel 
imports). The current paper makes no attempt to survey the history 
of these changes, some of which are reviewed by Plomer. 2  Its 
purpose is to document how the EPS has been and is being used by 
companies that patent inventions.  
There is a literature which analyses aspects of how the EPS 
functions and that we do not review in detail here. This literature is 
surprisingly small. Hall & Helmers3 analyse accession of a series of 
countries to the EPS. Mejer & Van Pottelsberghe 4  study the 
functioning of the EPS at an aggregate level and document the 
complexity of the current system, the genesis of which is laid out by 
Plomer. 5  Validation of patents within the EPS is analysed by 
Harhoff, Hoisl, Reichl, & Van Pottelsberghe6 and in Harhoff, Hoisl, 
Vandeput, & Van Pottelsberghe.7 These papers do not provide the 
detailed description of how the EPS is used that we provide here. 
A much larger literature uses data from the EPO to analyse various 
aspects of companies’ patenting behaviour in Europe. Some of this 
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work is surveyed by Harhoff & Hall.8 This literature has not so far 
used data from NPOs in Europe.  
This paper is descriptive: it outlines how companies use the patent 
system, not why they make the choices we document. Such a 
descriptive analysis may be useful for those embarking on analytical 
projects, which seek to uncover causal effects of administrative, 
legal or judicial reforms. It may also be helpful as a record of how 
the EPS worked prior to the significant legal and administrative 
changes that will be brought about when the Unitary Patent and the 
Unified Patent Court begin to operate in the near future. We note 
that while our descriptive analysis is intended to present facts about 
the use of patents in Europe, none of the graphs presented below can 
be read as showing that there are causal relationships between the 
variables we describe. In analyses of patent data policy makers are 
often interested to understand whether stronger or broader 
protection has effects on job creation, productivity or economic 
growth.9 This paper does not engage directly with these questions 
and does not adopt forms of analysis that are suited to uncovering 
causal effects. We do provide some comparative analysis of 
patenting that raises questions about future potential for growth 
based on innovation in some European countries. An answer to these 
questions will require a different approach from that adopted here. 
The main aim of our paper is to set out facts about the EPS which 
are presented in the form of graphs and tables. To structure the 
analysis, we set out questions about the EPS. These are broadly 
motivated by the desire to understand how companies use the EPS 
to protect patentable inventions. 
The paper is structured as follows: first we set out the motivating 
questions, then we present results and discussion of these. 
Following this we provide details of the data and the methods used 
to construct it.10 As a general point we should emphasize that the 
results presented below generally encompass patents granted either 
by EPO or at least one NPO unless this is otherwise stated. Where 
patents from the same patent family are granted by both the EPO 
and the NPO we count both. A detailed analysis of such double 
patents is relegated to Section XI. 
 
I. Motivation 
 
The EPO has a unique role within the EPS. It offers patent applicants 
the service of a one-stop-shop for the process of obtaining a granted 
patent. Should the applicant obtain a granted patent they must then 
validate the patent with those national offices (NPOs) in which the 
patent is to take effect. Validation allows companies to customize 
the size of the territory within which they wish their patents to take 
effect. Once companies have validated a patent and started to pay 
fees to NPOs they can always reduce the territorial extent of 
3 Hall/Helmers, The Impact of International Patent Systems: Evidence from 
Accession to the European Patent Convention, NBER 2018. 
4 Mejer/van Pottelsberghe, Economic Incongruities in the European Patent 
System, European Journal of Law and Economics 2012, 215-234. 
5 Plomer (oben Fn. 2). 
6 Harhoff/Hoisl/Reichl/van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Patent Validation at 
the Country Level: The Role of Fees and Translation Costs, Research Policy 
2009, 1423-1437. 
7 Harhoff/Hoisl/Vandeput/van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Languages, Fees 
and the International Scope of Patenting, in: Palgrave Handbook of 
Economics and Language, Springer 2016, pp. 403-422. 
8  Harhoff/Hall, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, Annual 
Review of Economics 2012, 541-565. 
9 Two recent reports that have provided some insight into the correlations 
between use of IP and jobs in Europe and are published by EU IPO 
(Webpage last accessed on the 18.8.2018).  
10 This structure is unusual, as most articles will present data construction 
and methodological details before providing the main findings. As this paper 
is mainly descriptive and most of our analysis does not involve statistical or 
mathematical methods we believe that relegating details of data construction 
and methods to later sections of this paper is in the interest of our readers. 
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protection by allowing their patent to lapse in some countries. They 
cannot later extend protection to countries in which the patent was 
not validated after grant. As time has passed and the EPS has 
expanded to additional countries, firms seeking extensive territorial 
protection for their patents would have increasingly found the EPO 
to be the more attractive office for patent examination and 
maintenance. 
Alternatively companies can submit their patents to one or more 
NPOs directly. Generally speaking, submitting an application to 
EPO is more attractive as the number of territories within the EPS 
in which the patent is to be enforced increases and if the EPO is 
more likely to grant a patent than some of the NPOs. 
This leads us to three questions: 
1. Have companies used the EPO with increasing frequency as 
time has passed? 
2. If so, have all types of companies used the EPO with increasing 
frequency as time has passed? Here we consider country of 
origin, size of the company and technology focus as dimensions 
along which we differentiate company type. 
3. Is the EPO more or less strict in examining patents than the 
NPOs and does it examine more or less quickly? 
In addition, we extend the analysis of country origin of applicants 
to show how portfolios of granted patents of companies from 
France, Germany and Great Britain have developed during the last 
three decades. The comparison reveals strong differences across 
these three countries that deserve further analysis. 
 
II. Results 
 
Creation of the EPO simplified the patent application process for 
companies which sought patent protection in multiple European11 
countries. The main advantage was a reduction in costs of obtaining 
a granted patent. Furthermore, the administrative burden was 
reduced, as companies negotiate with only one office over the text 
of the patent application. The main disadvantage of using this 
procedure is the risk associated with a rejection by EPO. It is 
conceivable that EPO might reject the patent application while one 
or more NPOs would not. In practice applicants tend to mitigate the 
risk of EPO rejection by applying to one NPO before subsequently 
also applying to EPO. In most cases the national application is later 
dropped.12  
Turning to Question 1 we provide two figures. Figure 1 shows the 
total number of applications that resulted in a granted patent within 
the EPS. The total number of individual applications resulting in 
granted patents submitted to EPO has been higher than the total 
number of applications resulting in granted patents submitted to the 
ten largest national offices13 within the EPS since 2002. There is a 
slight trend for a widening of the gap between the NPOs and the 
EPO, but there is also clearly a lot of variation, which is driven by 
relative fees and changes to administrative procedures. The 
sensitivity of applications to fees set within the EPS is explored in 
detail by Harhoff, Garanasvili, & von Graevenitz.14  
Figure 1 also shows some data for the largest national offices. Their 
ranking as set out in Table 1 is fairly stable over time, with DPMA 
(DE), INPI (FR) and IPO UK (GB) granting the highest number of 
patents. Notice that the data contained in the PATSTAT database on 
patents granted in Italy is likely to be unreliable. 
                                               
11 EPO provides patent protection within the EPS territory. Currently EPS 
includes 38 countries, while it only consisted of 8 member states in 1978. 
12 We analyse the case of double patents, where the national application is 
granted in parallel to the EPO application, in the methodology section below. 
13 The ten largest patent offices by patents granted between 1978 and 2012 
within the EPS are set out in Table 1 in Section XII. These comprise DPMA 
Figure 1: Granted patents in the EPS. Own calculations based on data 
obtained from PATSTAT 2016. The data exclude utility models 
(Gebrauchsmuster) that are granted by DPMA(DE), OP(AT), UIBM(IT) and 
OEPM(ES). 
 
Since patents granted by EPO are only valid in an EPS member state 
once they have been validated there, the comparison between 
patents granted by EPO and patents granted by the NPOs may be 
unhelpful for some purposes.  
Figure 2 provides a comparison between the total level of patents 
granted by the largest ten NPOs and the total number of patents 
validated within the EPS after grant by EPO. The median patent 
granted by EPO results in 6 validations. Figure 2 shows that once 
validations are taken into account the EPO grants the majority of 
patents that are in force in the territory covered by the EPS and this 
has been the case for three decades. 
 
 
Figure 2: Patents validated within the EPS after grant by EPO. The drop off 
in validations and national grants after 2014 is the result of grant lags. It 
does not indicate a real drop in validations and grants. 
 
We explore details of the validation behaviour of companies further 
below. 
Figures 1 and 2 raise the question which types of companies use 
which offices. This question has multiple dimensions: the size of the 
company, its country of origin, the technology it focuses on and 
(DE), INPI (FR), UK IPO (GB), UIBM (IT), OEP (AT), OEPM (ES), 
IGE(CH), RVO(NL), PRV(SE), OPRI (BE).  
14 Harhoff/Garanasvili/von Graevenitz, Patenting Strategies in the European 
Patent System, London, CGR 2018. 
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number of countries within which the company seeks to protect the 
patent are explored below.  
 
III. Size of Companies 
 
The size of each company would ideally be measured through assets 
or the number of employees. This would require a match between 
the applicant names from PATSTAT and from company registers. 
Such a match exists only very partially and due to the limitations of 
publicly available company registers it does not extend to the vast 
majority of patentees. We use the size of the companies’ patent 
portfolios to approximate company size here. This still requires a 
significant effort in cleaning and matching company names within 
PATSTAT. This work is described in the methodology section. 
Figure 3 shows which fraction of companies had obtained portfolios 
of granted patents from either the ten largest NPOs within the EPS 
or from EPO by 2010. It shows that the fraction of companies 
holding a single patent is 63.4% for EPO while it is 69.5% at the 
NPOs. These numbers are likely biased upwards by our inability to 
correctly identify all company groups, but there is no reason to 
assume that the bias is significantly higher in the data from the 
NPOs.15  
 
 
Figure 3: Patent portfolio sizes in 2015 - Log-log plot of fraction of 
applicants with patent portfolio of a given size based on all patents granted 
by EPO or NPOs before 2015. 
 
This indicates that the NPOs are somewhat more important for the 
very smallest companies seeking to obtain patent protection within 
the EPS. Our data indicate that the fraction of companies holding 
more than two patents in their portfolio is always higher at EPO than 
at the NPOs.  For the owners of very large patent portfolios we are 
much more likely to have identified the size of the portfolios 
correctly. Figure 3 also shows that the largest portfolios at EPO are 
of a similar size to the largest portfolios within the NPOs. Table 2 
in Section XII lists the owners of the largest 25 portfolios at EPO 
and within the NPOs. The portfolios are based on the sum of all 
patents granted by either type of office by 2016. Table 2 reveals that 
many of the largest companies obtain granted patents from both 
EPO and some NPOs. It also provides a hint of what might motivate 
these larger companies to prefer either EPO or the NPOs: large 
manufacturers of chemical or pharmaceutical products tend to be 
more frequent in the top 25 applicants at EPO as are large companies 
not headquartered in Europe. The most significant technology 
                                               
15 If one restricts analysis to European companies only, then the proportion 
of single patent portfolios at the NPOs rises to 71.1% and remains at 63.8% 
for EPO. 
institutes supported by national governments are prominent 
amongst the top 25 portfolios at the NPOs. Of the companies that 
are headquartered in Europe many rely on the NPOs as well as EPO. 
 
IV. Country of Origin 
 
Table 3 provides a similar analysis at the level of the country of 
origin of the applicant company. This table needs to be read with a 
pinch of salt as the inventors could well have a different nationality 
from that attached to the company and the patent may well have 
originated in a research facility in a different country too. Ignoring 
such details Table 3 shows that companies from the top 5 countries 
using EPO are also among the companies from the top 6 countries 
using the NPOs. Italy is the only country not in the top 5 countries 
of origin at EPO that is in the top 5 countries of origin at the NPOs. 
Taking this a little further we can analyse the ratio of the number of 
patents going to the NPOs over those going to the EPO for each 
country of origin. For Germany this number is 1.75, indicating that 
for every patent granted by EPO to a German company 1.75 are 
granted by an NPO. For France this ratio is 3.07 while for the US it 
is 0.48 and Japan it is 0.54. Using this metric Spain (10.9), Austria 
(6.79) and Italy (3.58) are the outliers from Europe. Meanwhile 
companies from Canada (1.32) and Korea (1.01) behave very 
differently from those from the US and Japan.  This is remarkable 
as it suggests that companies from some non-EU countries rely 
much less on the EPO than we might expect. 
Some more detail on how companies from different countries use 
the NPOs is provided in Figure 4. This shows that DPMA is often 
used by applicants that are not situated in Germany. It also shows 
that INPI (FR) and IPO UK (GB) are important destinations for 
patent applications from inside and outside Europe.  
 
Figure 4: Frequency of patent applications at NPOs (2008-2012). Size of 
circles indicates how often applicants who first submitted a patent to a 
priority office (x-axis) then submitted to each NPO (y-axis). Assigning 
nationality to the company on the basis of priority office is slightly different 
than relying on country codes for companies themselves. Most often the two 
are the same.  
 
While US companies prefer IPO UK to INPI by a large margin, 
Japanese companies are evenly split and German and Spanish 
companies somewhat prefer INPI. We do not include a similar graph 
for the period 1998-2002. Comparison of the above with this second 
graph reveals that Japanese and US companies reduced the number 
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of direct applications to national offices in the decade between 2000 
and 2010. 
We can also compare how companies validated patents granted by 
EPO across national offices. This is done in Figure 5. This reveals 
that DPMA (DE), INPI (FR) and IPO UK (GB) are the most 
important offices for validation, mirroring choices made by 
companies that rely just on NPOs. However, validations at the 
smaller national offices in Europe are far more significant than 
direct applications regardless of the origin of the applicant.  
 
 
Figure 5:Frequency of validation at NPOs. Size of circles as in Figure 4. 
 
To complete this analysis of the origin of the applicants at EPO and 
NPOs Figure 6 shows the share of applications at EPO/ the NPOs 
that arose from companies of a specific country.  
 
 
Figure 6: Share of applications at EPO and National Offices in four different 
years made by companies from countries indicated on graph. 
 
Figure 6 shows that the share of applications at EPO due to 
companies from Germany, France and Italy steadily increased from 
                                               
16  Pure patent counts are generally a very poor indicator of innovation 
activity, but the simultaneous decline of patents coming from UK firms at 
all offices in the EU is noteworthy, especially when compared to the 
experience of France, Germany and Italy in the same period. We provide 
further analysis of this question in Figures 9, 10 and 11 below.  
17 Hall / Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press; 2001 and Casper / 
2000 to 2010 while the share of US and Japanese applications at 
EPO fell significantly. Meanwhile the share of US applications at 
the NPOs increased slightly and that of Japanese applications fell 
slightly. Figure 6 also shows that the share of applications due to 
companies from Great Britain decreased both at EPO and at the 
NPOs.16 
 
V. Technology focus 
 
The technological focus of an applicant company cannot be entirely 
separated from the origin of the company. It has been documented 
previously that the industrial structure of different capitalist 
economies varies significantly 17. Some of the differences in the 
behaviour of companies from different countries which the previous 
section documents may therefore arise from differences in industry 
structure. 
Here we begin by showing how these differences in the use of the 
patent system across industries have evolved over the last 3 decades.  
 
Figure 7: Share of Chemistry patents granted by EPO out of all patents 
granted by EPO and NPOs by technology area. 
 
Figure 8: Share of Mechanical Engineering patents granted by EPO out of 
all patents granted by EPO and NPOs by technology area. 
 
The patent system is frequently divided into 5 large and 35 more 
disaggregated technology areas.18 Figures 7 and 8 show first that the 
Soskice, Sectoral systems of innovation and varieties of capitalism: 
explaining the development of high-technology entrepreneurship in 
Europe. Sectoral systems of innovation. 2004:348-87. 
18 The scheme according to which patents are sorted into these technologies 
is provided by Schmoch, Concept of a Technology Classification for Country 
Comparisons, in: Final Report to the World Intellectual Property 
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share of patents granted by EPO increased from zero to substantial 
shares between 1978 and 1998. Thereafter shares stabilized.  
Comparing the two largest main areas, Chemicals (22.5% of all 
patents granted in Europe) and Mechanical Engineering (34.5%) it 
emerges above all that a larger share of Chemicals patents is granted 
by EPO while the share of Mechanical Engineering patents granted 
there has increased to just above 50% only in the last decade.  
These averages hide a wide range of variation: in Chemicals 
approximately 80% of all patents granted in Europe are granted by 
EPO while only around 50% of patents in Environmental 
Technology are granted by EPO. Similarly, around 70% of patents 
in Textiles and Paper Machines are granted by EPO but only around 
40% in Thermal Processes. 
The main explanation for this difference is likely to be the ease with 
which innovations protected by patents in Chemistry can be 
reengineered and manufactured and the relatively greater costs of 
exploiting innovations protected by patents in Mechanical 
Engineering. This is also evident when comparing how widely 
patents are validated when they are granted by EPO. We turn to this 
aspect in the following section. 
 
 
Figure 9: Density of patents granted in the EPS in 35 technology areas by 
country of origin. For each country the symbol is higher, if the share of 
patents in a technology area out of all patents granted to firms from that 
country is greater. 
 
First, we return briefly to the question of industrial structure by 
comparing patenting behaviour of firms from Germany, France and 
Great Britain. Figure 9 shows which technology areas each country 
had the largest exposure to prior to 2000 – with Great Britain having 
a larger share of its patenting than France and Germany in 
Audiovisual, Telecom, Optics, Measurement, Control, 
Pharmaceuticals, Materials Chemistry and Civil Engineering. 
Figure 10 analyses how patenting grew between 1990-2000 and 
2004-2014 for each technology area. 
The figure clearly shows that patenting growth by companies from 
Great Britain lagged behind that in France and Germany over this 
period in almost all technology areas. Of the technology areas which 
the UK was comparatively more focused on prior to 2000 only 
Pharmaceuticals and Civil Engineering have at least a growth rate 
of patenting on a par with the other two economies. There is not a 
single technology area in which the growth rate of UK patenting 
exceeded that of France or Germany during this period. This 
                                               
Organization (WIPO), Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation 
Research, Karlsruhe, 2008. 
19  Moser/Ohmstedt/Rhode, Patent citations – an analysis of quality 
differences and citing practices in hybrid corn, Management Science 2017, 
underscores the findings from the aggregate data reported in Figure 
6.  
 
 
Figure 10: Growth rate of granted patents across 35 technology areas by 
country of origin within the EPS. The growth is based on the decade 1990-
2000 compared to the period 2004-2014. 
 
While this type of analysis is suggestive one may remain sceptical 
of it. For instance, the reader may be aware of the fact that many 
innovations protected by patents that are in force are not sold on the 
market or used in production. In other words, they exist only in order 
to prevent others from marketing these innovations. Having 
observed this fact, it might be that applicants from Great Britain are 
generally less likely to hold such patents in their portfolios. To 
address this possibility Figure 11 is based only on patents receiving 
at least six citations within five years of publication in patents issued 
by EPO. Economists have found repeatedly that citations to patents 
provide a rough indication of the economic impact of the cited 
patents19. A focus on these very highly cited patents should therefore 
provide some indication of the ability of each of these economies to 
generate significant innovations. 
 
Figure 11: Highly Cited Patents: Each point is a technology area. On the x-
axis we plot the share of highly cited patents in the area out of all highly 
cited patents granted to companies from that country in 2000. On the y-axis 
we plot the growth in highly cited patents in that area between 1990 and 
1926-1940. Trajtenberg, A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the 
value of innovations, Rand Journal of Economics 1990, 172-187. 
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2010. The lines are regressions of the growth of patenting on the importance 
of each sector. These reveal that the average growth of highly cited patents 
across sectors was highest in Germany and lowest in Great Britain. 
 
In Figure 11 we combine the approach of the previous two graphs 
by plotting the within country share of highly cited patents granted 
in 2000 in each technology area on the x-axis and the growth in 
highly cited patents in each area and country between 1990 and 2010 
on the y-axis.20  
The result is very similar to that of the previous graphs: companies 
from Great Britain have grown the number of highly cited patents at 
a lower rate than companies from France or Germany over the two 
decades between 1990 and 2010. It matters little whether a 
technology area accounts for a large or small share of patents in each 
country’s portfolio of highly cited patents.  
When considering why these results emerge it may be worth taking 
into account that these three economies are of a different size. Next, 
we show how many highly cited patents each country generated in 
Europe per constant trillion, year 2000 US dollars of GDP. Table 1 
demonstrates that relative to the size of the economy Great Britain 
has for a long time produced fewer highly cited patents than either 
France or Germany. Note that in this period the manufacturing share 
of GDP in France and Great Britain declined from around 16% to 
10%. Meanwhile in Germany it has remained at around 20%. The 
explanation for the large difference in the number of highly cited 
patents generated between France and Great Britain cannot be due 
to this factor. 
 
 DE FR GB 
1990 1967.30 2533.35 1172.60 
2000 2259.04 1862.38 808.99 
2010 3108.78 2707.56 828.28 
Table 1: Highly cited patents per trillion, constant 2000 US $. Data on GDP 
from OECD.21 
 
It is well documented by OECD that both public and private R&D 
investment levels in the UK have been significantly lower than those 
in France or Germany since the early 1980’s.22 The findings we 
outline here suggest that this difference in R&D investment has had 
a material effect on patenting by companies from Great Britain.23 
What we do not know is whether this has also affected their 
productivity and thereby wealth and growth in Great Britain. 
Overall the analysis suggest that a detailed analysis of this question 
is warranted.  
 
VI. Number of Countries 
 
The focus of this section is the number of countries in which each 
patent granted by EPO is validated. In the previous section we 
showed that the share of patents in Europe granted by EPO is higher 
                                               
20 In response to a query based on this analysis Stuart Graham [Georgia 
Institute of Technology, and formerly Chief Economist at the United States 
Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO)] analysed patents granted by USPTO 
to companies from Germany, France and Britain. His results confirm that 
British companies did not obtain increases in patents granted by USPTO that 
are comparable to companies from France or Germany after 2005. 
21  The same ranking emerges from the EU’s Science, Research and 
Innovation Performance of the EU (SRIP) report 2018 where PCT patent 
applications are used (<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/srip-report-
chap-1-4_2018_en.pdf>). 
22 One way of demonstrating this is to look at the share of R&D in gross 
domestic spending in GDP in these countries: 
on average in Chemistry related technologies than in those of 
Mechanical Engineering.  
 
Figure 12: Chemicals - Distribution of validations by year. 
 
One explanation for this is the greater need to protect innovations in 
Chemistry in each country in Europe to prevent parallel imports. 
This means that the advantage from using EPO is felt particularly 
keenly by companies that require a wide territorial coverage for their 
patents. 
Figure 12 shows that as the number of member states within the EPS 
increased over time so did the number of countries in which firms 
validated patents in Chemistry. The distribution of validations is 
bimodal in this field: one set of patents is validated on average in 
six countries, whilst there is a second maximum close to or at the 
maximum number of countries in which a patent can be validated. 
This maximum increases over time as more countries join the EPS. 
 
 
Figure 13: Mechanical Engineering – Distribution of validations by year. 
<https://data.oecd.org/chart/5iz4> (last accessed on 17 Sept. 2018). A 
similar picture emerges when only the Business financed share of R&D is 
considered. A recent report by IPO UK provides additional detail on UK 
investments in R&D (IPO UK, 2017).  
23  Hall/Helmers/Sena, The importance (or not) of patents to UK firms, 
Oxford Economic Papers 2013, 603-629, document that rather few 
companies in the UK use the patent system. A recent report by EU IPO on 
trade secrets and patenting shows that the proportion of firms relying on 
patents in Germany is 20% points higher there (47.8% v 27.3%): 
<https://bit.ly/2tPjawW>. 
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In contrast, patents granted in Mechanical Engineering have 
continuously been validated in 4 or 5 countries on average as is 
shown in Figure 13. There is a tail reaching the maximally possible 
number of validations, but the number of cases for which this tail is 
reached is quite small. 
Figures 4 and 5 above indicated that some countries are more 
frequently chosen as places to validate a patent than others. The 
Figures also revealed that companies which patent only at NPOs 
prefer the same countries as those using the EPO. Most frequently 
these are Germany, France and Great Britain, which we refer to as 
the core countries.  
 
Figure 14: Validation vectors at EPO based on patents granted by EPO 
and validated in at least one country within the EPS. 
 
Figures 14 and 15 provide an insight into the combinations of 
countries which applicants rely on most frequently when validating 
patents in the EU. The choice of the set of countries in which to 
validate can be seen as a vector in the space of countries: the 
validation vector. Figure 14 shows how frequently the most popular 
such vectors were used. It shows that after the mid 90s the most 
frequently used validation vector is the core countries (DE, FR, GB). 
More recently combinations of the core with Italy have also become 
popular.  
 
 
Figure 15: National application and grant vectors. 
                                               
24 While DPMA (DE), IPO UK (GB), OEPM (ES) and OEP (AT) examine 
patents substantively, INPI(FR) and UIBM (IT) register patents for which a 
search report is published. Nonetheless INPI grants fewer patents submitted 
 
The figure also shows that earlier in the history of the EPO many 
patents were validated in a much larger set of countries, which we 
refer to as the “main” set of countries. Occasionally applicants 
validate only in a subset of the core, usually Germany and one of 
the other two countries – the increased popularity of the 
combination of Germany and France over the combination of 
Germany and GB most likely accounts for why more companies 
now validate in France than in Great Britain. 
Usually we would expect companies that are only seeking patent 
protection in two European countries to rely on the NPOs. Figure 15 
shows that cases in which this arises are quite rare. The vast majority 
of patents granted by the NPOs do not have a second or third patent 
in the family that is granted by another European NPO. Where such 
patent pairs do arise, they usually get filed at the offices of the core 
countries noted above. 
 
 
VII. Examination Durations and Grant Propensity 
 
Whenever a company intends to protect its patent only in a few 
select countries, the decision whether to apply to EPO or a set of 
NPOs may be driven by the probability that the patent will be 
granted or by the length of time it takes the office to grant the patent. 
These two variables are interrelated: offices that examine a patent in 
great detail may take longer to grant everything else being equal. In 
addition, the company applying for the patent may have an interest 
to obtain a patent grant very quickly or more often as late as 
possible. The longer the company can keep the final version of the 
patent document open, the more opportunities it has of adapting that 
text to cover commercially valuable applications. This means that 
the following figures present data that are the result of patent office 
procedures and company choices. This makes it hard to draw firm 
conclusions from these figures about the performance of the offices. 
 
Figure 16: National office grant rates by year of patent application. 
 
We begin by comparing the grant rates of the six largest NPOs. 
Figure 16 shows that while DPMA and IPO UK are tough venues 
for applicants, the other four offices (INPI (FR), UIBM (IT), 
OP(AT) and OEPM(ES)) grant large proportions of patents 
submitted to them. There may be many reasons for these differences 
– quality of applications may differ across offices just as much as 
office procedures do.24  
to it than either OEPM or OEP. More detail on different offices’ approaches 
to examination and search are provided by EPO at this site 
(<https://www.epo.org/applying/national.html>). WIPO has published an 
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Turning to Figure 17 it becomes apparent that the EPO had a lower 
granted rate than the four “lenient” NPOs and higher grant rate than 
DPMA and IPO UK. The figure 17 also reveals that French and 
German applicants who used EPO had about the same rate of 
success there over time, in spite of the significantly different grant 
rates at the respective national offices. Assuming that examiners at 
EPO applied the same criteria to patents, this may go some way to 
explaining why the ratio of national patents to EPO patents held by 
French firms (3.07) is almost double that of German firms (1.75). 
British firms, like their German competitors face a tough domestic 
office, but also had a harder time to obtain patents at EPO than 
French or German firms. 
 
Figure 17: Grant rates at EPO by country of applicant. 
 
This may be partly due to industry composition, but it is interesting 
to note the stability of the difference in grant rates between 
German/French and British firms as the EPO became stricter after 
1996. Note also that while the grant rate for Italian applicants at EPO 
was similar to that for British applicants until 1996, it is now much 
closer to that for French, German or Austrian applicants.  
 
 
Figure 18: Examination duration at EPO by country of origin of the 
applicant. 
 
The reason for the fall in the grant rates at EPO can be found in the 
increase in applications and resulting longer examination durations 
at EPO in the 1990s. This led to calls for reform that ultimately 
resulted in lower grant rates as seen in Figure 17. Figure 18 shows 
that examination durations at EPO increased sharply for patents 
                                               
informative policy guide on search and examination 
(<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_guide_patentsearch.pd
f>).  
submitted around 1995, regardless of the country of origin of the 
applicant. 
Meanwhile the examination duration at NPOs was significantly 
lower throughout this period, even at the “tougher” NPOs in Britain 
and Germany. It is hard to imagine that this was due solely to 
differences in applicant behaviour. Note that Figure 19 reveals that 
applications at INPI were granted more quickly than those at DPMA 
and IPO UK over almost the entire period under consideration, just 
as one would expect, if INPI was being less exacting of applicants 
than the other two offices. Data for UIBM (IT) reported here is 
suspect as is also the case for Figure 16 above. 
 
Figure 19: Examination duration at NPOs 
 
VIII. Summary and Discussion 
 
The EPS has operated in its current form since 1978. In this time 
there has been a shift of patenting away from the NPOs towards 
EPO. The volume of patent grants has remained high at the largest 
NPOs indicating that many companies obtain a valuable service 
from these NPOs. This paper has documented that some applicants 
use both the EPO and the NPOs in parallel. Harhoff, Garanasvili, & 
von Graevenitz25 show that fee changes at EPO or NPOs induced 
some applicants to switch between EPO and the NPOs. They also 
show that this affects the examination durations of patents submitted 
by other companies. In sum these results show that within the EPS 
the largest NPOs and EPO are complementary insitutions: where 
one becomes less attractive companies can fall back on the other. It 
seems highly likely that this applies not just to fees but also to 
examination duration and examination quality. 
 To date the patent granting institutions within the EPS do not 
coordinate fee setting, hiring of examiners or the examination 
procedure they apply. This lack of coordination leads to externalities 
that create costs for companies using the EPS. Our analysis suggests 
that the EPS could contribute better to the productivity of the 
European economy if greater coordination were achieved. Our 
analysis does not suggest that the NPOs are redundant. 
 
IX. Data and Methodology 
 
In this section we provide some more detail on how the data we use 
was constructed. We also discuss some results we obtained on 
parallel patenting within the EPS. 
 
25 Harhoff/Garanasvili/von Graevenitz (supra note 14). 
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X. Cleaning and Matching Applicant Names 
 
To link applicants’ names across offices we standardized and 
aggregated portfolios within the EPO and the national data 
separately. Having completed this step, we then linked portfolios 
across the two datasets. Standardisation and aggregation proceeded 
in four steps: first, we standardized all names, cleaning out 
punctuation marks and standardizing legal forms; 26  next we 
aggregated portfolios within the EPO data and the national data 
using a file derived from Derwent’s encoding of patent applicants;27 
third we aggregated all remaining patents using standardized names. 
Finally, we then checked the largest remaining portfolios and 
assigned these to firm groups identified previously, where this was 
appropriate. 
The remaining patents were assigned to firms on the basis of firms’ 
standardised names. Overall, we have 521564 separate firms in the 
data with 82078 in the EPO data and 521533 in the national office 
data. 
Linking of portfolios across the two main datasets (EPO and 
national offices) proceeded in three steps: first, we appended the 
national data to the EPO data, next we linked the firm group 
identifiers from the national data to the EPO data for all those 
instances in which patents in the same patent family existed at EPO 
and national offices and we had either assigned the same Derwent 
code or the same standardized name to both patents. We then 
extended the national firm group identifiers to all EPO patents 
within the firm groups at EPO. 
We checked the results of this procedure by inspecting the 
standardized names in the largest ten portfolios thus created. Next, 
we manually checked the largest portfolios of patents within EPO 
that we had not assigned a national firm identifier and manually 
attached such identifiers on the basis of firms’ names where 
appropriate. Finally, we created firm identifiers based on 
standardised names for those firms in the EPO data that had not yet 
been assigned a firm identifier. 
Overall there are 3,524,218 granted patents in the dataset we have 
constructed. 
 
XI. Double Patenting 
 
One quirk of the EPS is the possibility that one patent application 
submitted to one or more NPOs and to the EPO may be granted by 
both. Due to differences in procedures the patents are not usually 
granted at exactly the same time. When the same patent is granted 
by EPO and an NPO it is theoretically possible that the owner 
obtains two versions of the patent in one jurisdiction. National 
patent laws in Europe differ as to what happens next: in Germany 
and France the national patent automatically loses validity when the 
EPO patent is finally granted, while in several other jurisdictions the 
national patent (e.g. Austria, Sweden) both patents remain valid. 
Double patents arise for good reasons: as illustrated in Figure 18 
EPO takes longer to grant than the NPOs on average. Some 
applicants may therefore prefer to obtain an earlier national grant, 
while wrangling with EPO over the final text of the patent that is 
then extended to EPS member states and the home country.  
We have found that almost 69% of double patents are granted by 
either DPMA (79,334) or INPI (94,554) for patents with an 
application date before 2011. Figure 20 shows that the vast majority 
                                               
26 We used files originally created by Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmers 
for this. We are grateful to them for sharing these files. 
27 15 This file contains code to identify company groups. We found 4094 
firm groups in the EPO data and 5684 firm groups in the national office data. 
of such cases are those for which the national grant date precedes 
that at EPO. The median difference is around 2 years for patents first 
granted by DPMA, INPI and UIBM. It may be interesting to note 
that the examination duration at EPO of patents for which a national 
patent is granted is shorter by almost 1 year than that of patents for 
which no national patent is granted. The portfolios of firms that 
obtain double patents tend to be smaller on average than those of 
firms that drop the national applications before grant. Both findings 
suggest that double patents are a form of insurance for smaller 
applicants. 
15% of patents granted by DPMA and 23% of patents granted by 
INPI were subsequently also granted by EPO in the period we study.  
 
 
Figure 20: Difference between grant date at EPO and grant date at 
INPI(blue)/DPMA(yellow)in years for patents granted by both EPO and the 
NPO. 
 
XII. Tables 
 
Table 1 
Granted patents by office 
Office Nat 1982 1992 2002 2012 1978 - 
2013 
EPO EP 5638 32021 49891 69154 1236951 
DPMA DE 10468 17406 18201 13547 529360 
INPI FR 8257 11286 9579 13673 415143 
IPO 
UK GB 18664 9380 9090 6222 326768 
UIBM IT 11 4465 6260 6023 223660 
OP AT 3894 11358 1845 2299 161991 
OEPM ES 4723 2719 1550 4060 105758 
IGE CH 1892 1882 972 449 65178 
RVO NL 84 696 2966 1972 48594 
PRV SE 9 34 2700 977 37396 
OPRI BE 4039 7 0 0 33910 
Total  57679 91254 103054 118376 3184709 
As the firm sets do not overlap entirely we have 5905 separate company 
groups in our data. 
  
Seite 10 von 10 
 
Note: This table lists the number of patents granted by the 10 largest NPOs 
within the EPS (by total grants) in the years 1978-2012. Notice that the 
Belgian office has not granted patents since 1988 and is included here by 
virtue of the volume of patents granted prior to that year. The table is ordered 
by the total number of patents granted between 1978 and 2012. 
 
Table 2 
Largest Portfolios at EPO and NPOs 
Company 
Patent 
Stock Company 
Patent 
Stock 
    
SIEMENS 24846 SIEMENS 33210 
ROBERT 
BOSCH 14684 ROBERT BOSCH 19095 
PHILIPS 14676 DAIMLER 17223 
BASF 13679 MITSUBISHI 11790 
MATSUSHITA 
EL. 11969 
PEUGEOT 
CITROEN  11108 
CANON  11696 VALEO VISION 9682 
BAYER  10868 L'OREAL 9550 
IBM 9539 RENAULT  8931 
SONY  9205 
GENERAL 
ELECTRIC 8845 
HITACHI  8384 PHILIPS  8290 
TOSHIBA 7384 SAMSUNG 7622 
ERICSSON 7383 
COM. A EN. 
ATOMIQUE 7584 
SAMSUNG 7270 HONDA  6401 
DU PONT 7256 MANNESMANN  6155 
HONDA 
MOTOR  7188 AIRBUS 6138 
TOYOTA  7144 INFINEON  5793 
3M 6893 SONY  5467 
FUJITSU 6827 THOMSON CSF 5215 
GENERAL 
ELECTRIC  6703 
FRAUNHOFER 
GES 5160 
NEC  6477 ALCATEL 4776 
ALCATEL 5680 
RHONE 
POULENC 4559 
EASTMAN 
KODAK  5580 CANON  4528 
FUJI PHOTO  5540 ABB 4405 
HOECHST  5098 AUDI  4174 
NOKIA  5094 
INST. FR DU 
PETROLE   3962 
Note: This table lists the largest portfolios of patents granted by EPO and the 
NPOs. In bold those companies that are not listed on the other side of the 
table. This does not imply that those companies have no patents granted by 
EPO/ an NPO. Only that those portfolios are too small to put the company 
in the top 25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Largest Country Portfolios at EPO and NPOs 
 EPO NPOs 
Rank CC Count CC Count 
     
1 US 316395 DE 530764 
2 DE 303732 FR 357929 
3 JP 260988 IT 167997 
4 FR 116440 US 153160 
5 GB 57510 GB 148179 
6 CH 54200 JP 142578 
7 IT 46932 AT 109864 
8 NL 42986 CH 83222 
9 SE 30818 ES 74683 
10 AT 16173 NL 53768 
11 KR 15721 SE 44164 
12 CA 15011 BE 29750 
13 BE 13367 AU 19875 
14 FI 12893 CA 19770 
15 DK 10069 KR 15842 
16 ES 6851 TW 10371 
17 AU 6609 FI 7691 
18 CN 5641 SU 7055 
19 IL 5074 HU 5416 
20 NO 4300 DK 4904 
Note: CC stands for Country Code. The countries in bold are those from 
outside Europe. SU, stands for Soviet Union. Hardly any patents were 
granted with this code after 1998.  
 
 
